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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ST.A_TE OF l,.'r_A_H, 
Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 7830 
i\L R. BRl~CE~ 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about September 14th, 1951, M. R. Bruce, de-
fendant and respondent herein, delivered to one LeGrand 
Smith, an automobile dealer in S.panish Fork, Utah, at 
Smith's place of business in Spanish F;ork, a post-dated 
check drawn on the Eighth South Branch, First Security 
Bank of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, in the amount of 
$1075.00. This check was uttered in payment for six used 
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automobiles (Tr. 27, 28). The check.was dated September 
17, 1951. It was deposited in .the due course of business, 
but :was. rejected by the bank "for the fact that the ac-
count had been closed'' (Tr. 30, 47), and this fact was 
noted on the check when it was returned to Mr. Smith. 
The state's evidence showed that· the account of 
M. R. Bruce had been closed by the bank on August 22, 
1951, "for reasons of overdraft," and that several checks 
drawn by said M. R. Bruce had been returned because of 
insufficient funds between the period of August 3rd, and 
August 22nd, 1951; further, than no arrangements for 
credit had been made with the bank, by Bruce, after his 
account had been closed on August 22nd, 1951 (Tr. 46, 
47, 48, 49). Defendant was bound over from the City 
Court of Provo for trial in the District Court of the 
Flourth District. A jury was impanelled and sworn. De-
fendant did not testify nor did he produce any witnesses. 
At the close of the state's evidence, the court entertained-
and granted defendant's motion for dismissal (Tr. 50, 
51), whereupon, the state appealed from the decision of 
the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF' POINTS 
POINT I .. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING THE CASE 
FROM T.HE _JURY BY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION, 
TO DISMISS. 
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.A.RGUl\;fENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING THE CASE 
FROl\I THE JURY BY GRANTING DEFEND.A.NT'S lVIOTION 
TO DISlVIISS. 
It is appellant's vie'v of this case that the only ques-
tion to be deter1nined is 'vhether a post-dated check issued 
and delivered under circun1stances in evidence here, falls 
w·ithin the provisions of 105-18-11 UCA, 1943, as amend-
ed: if it does, the ruling of the lo,ver court is error. 
There is a division. of authority as to 'vhether a post-
dated check is such an instrument as is contemplated 
under the provisions of the various "cold check" statutes. 
The question can be found annotated in 95 ALR 496, IX. 
Post dated Checks. 
103-18-11, as amended by Ch. 87, L. Utah, 1945, pro-
vides: 
Any person 'vho for himself or,as the agent oi .. 
representative of another or as an officer of a · 
corporation, willfully, 'vith intent to defraud, 
n1akes or draws or utters or delivers any check, 
or draft or order upon any bank or depositary, or 
person, or firm, or corporation, for the payment of 
n1oney, knowing at the time of such 1naking, draw-
ing, uttering, or delivering that the maker or 
dra-\ver or the corporation has not sufficient funds 
in, or credit with said bank or depositary, or per-
son, or fir1n, or corporation, for the payment of 
such checks, draft or order, in full upon its pres-
entation, although no express representation is 
1nade 'vith reference thereto, is punishable by i1n-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prisonment in the county jail for not more than 
one year, or in the state prison for not more than 
14 years. 
Tlte making, drawing, uttering or delivering 
of such check, draft or order as aforesaid, shall 
be prirna facie evidence of intent to defraud. 
* * * 
T,he word "credit" as used herein shall be 
construed to mean an arrangement or understand-
ing with the bank or depositary, or person, or 
firm or corporation, for the payment of such 
check, draft or order. 
* * * 
In the case of State v. Taylor, 335 l\1o. 460, 73 SW 2d, 
378, 95 ALR ~76, the court had 'under consideration a 
statute substantially the same as our own in that section 
4305, R. S. Mo. 1929, includes "any check, draft or order, 
for the payment of money, upon any bank or other de-
pository." Our 103-18-11, above quoted covers "any 
check, or draft, or order upon any bank or despositary 
* * * for the payment of money * * *." The Missouri 
court in holding that a post-dated check falls within the 
provisions of their statute reasoned that such was so, 
because the legislature in enacting their false check 
statute had done so at a time after the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law had become a part of the law of the State of 
Missouri, and therefore, must have had. the provisions 
of that law 'in mind. The court pointed out, in an exhaus-
tive discussion of the Negotiable Instruments Law, that a 
check, as defined by said law, even though post-dated, is 
nevertheless, an instrument which would be included 
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\Yithin the \Yords •'check," Hdraft," or ••order" as used in 
the false check statute. It is to be noted that our false 
cheek statute \Yas enacted long after the Negotiable ln-
strmnents La\v had becoine the la\v of the State of Utah. 
The Supren1e (_---court of ('1alifornia in the case of 
People v. Bercovitz, 163 Cal. 636, 126 P. 479, upheld a 
conviction under their false check statute where the check 
\Vas postdated . ..._'\.t page 480, the court s~id: 
* * * Even if 've assume in accord with appel-
lant's clain1 that, by reason of the fact that the 
instrtuuent \vas postdated, it vvas not a "check" 
vvithin the meaning of that word as used in section 
476a, Penal Code, 'vhich vve do not concede, it 
''yas clearly a "draft," the giving of which under 
such circu~nstances is likev1ise inhibited by the 
section, the language being •'any check or. draft," 
* * * 
* * * There is nothing in the language used 
having the effect of excepting a case. from the 
operation of the statute merely because the "c~eck 
or draft" is postdated. * * * 
To the same effect see State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 
P. 838. 
The court's attention is respectfully· directed to the 
fact that the cases cited in the above referred to annota- · 
tion, which hold that criminal liability can not be based 
on the issuance of a postdated check, do so, with one ex-
ception, either on the ground that the statute under con-
sideration did not include the 'vords "draft or order," 
or because the evidence showed that the payee was in-
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formed there 'vere not sufficient funds to meet the check 
and there would not be until the date indicated on the 
(·heck. In this regard, it is to be observed that the Mis-
souri case cited by appellant does not consider fatal the 
fact that the payee knew or had reason to know that the 
e.heck was postdated. The California case deals with facts 
silnilar to thoNe in the instant case, in that the payee did 
not know that the drawer did not have sufficient funds 
to cover the check on the day of delivery. 
In State v. Trogstad, 98 Utah 565, 100 P2d 564, this 
court held that the drawing of a che~k against insufficient 
funds was not culpable conduct on the part of the drawer, 
because the payee understood there were no funds avail-
able and that she was to hold the check a few days until 
there were. This court said these circumstances created a 
borrower and lender relationship because the payee 
treated the check as a promise to pay, therefore rebut-
ting any idea that the check was delivered with intent to 
defraud. 
In the Trogstad case, supra, the court addressed it-
self to Section 11 of Chapter 18, Title 103, R.S.U., 1933. 
That statute, insofar as the elements of the crime are 
concerned, is identical to the present statute, above quot-
ed. The court on pag~ 566 said : 
The statute provides that there must be 
proved (a) an intent to defraud, and (b) a kno,vl-
edge that the maker or drawer did not have (1) 
sufficient funds or (2) credit with the bank for 
payment. The essence of the charge is that the 
injured party must have relied upon son1e false 
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and deceitful pretl~nse. ~rhe check 1nust have been 
dra,vn, uttered or delivered \villfully and \vith 
the intent to defraud and kno,ving there \vas 
neither ~ufficient fund8 nor credit with the firrn or 
person upon "Tho1n it \\Ta8 dra\vn. 
The specifie intent to defraud n1ust be found 
fron1 the e\?idence. Such intent n1ust be shown to 
exist in the n1ind of the rnaker or dra\Yer. Intent 
n1ny be found frorn the circtunstances. * * * 
The eourt in further justifying its reversal of the con-
viction said on page 567 : 
\\ ... hen it is proven that there is no account, an 
inference ·n1ay arise that there is not" credit but a 
erirninal conviction may not rest upon such infer-
ence alone. :iliay the state rest vvhen it has estab-
lished there is no account~ It rnust be shovvn, fur-
ther, that there is no credit. r_rhere n1ay be "no 
account," or ''insufficient funds" and yet there 
may be credit. This essential element vvas ·not 
proved. 
It is respectfully submi-tted that the evidence ad-
duced by the state in the instant case establish-es that the 
dravver, respondent herein, knew he did not have suffi-
cient funds to cover the check; further, that he knew he 
did not have u credit with the bank for payment." The 
testimony of Ronald H. Haslarn, an employee of the 
drawee bank, makes these two facts clear. On direct ex-
arnination ~Ir. Haslam, testifying from the permanent 
records of the bank, states as follows: (Tr. 48, 49) 
Q. vVhen was the account closed~ 
A. An August the 22nd, 1951. 
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Q. And you say for what reason was it closed? 
A. There was an overdraft shown on the books 
of $1.36, :x· * * 
Q. Was there any funds in that l\L R. Bruce ac-
count on Septernber 15, 1951 ~ 
A. No * * *. 
Q. Was there any money deposited in that ac-
count after August 22, 1951 ~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Is there any indication on the account as to 
checks being returned for insufficient funds~ 
A. Yes, sir, there are several. 
Q. Where are_ they~ 
A. They're from August the 3rd to August the 
22nd. 
* * * 
Q. IIave you made a search of your records to 
ascertain whether or not there was any ar-
rangen1ents made at the bank for creditto ~L 
· I~. Bruce after this account 'vas closed~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. State what you found. 
A. There was no such record of any arrange-
ment. 
Q. Was any arrangemenf for ·additional credit 
ever made by this defendant~ 
A. No, sir. 
The testimony of Mr. Smith, the complaining witness 
makes it clear that he accepted the check as present pay-
10 
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' 
ment for the six auto1nobiles, and that he was not inform-
ed that the eheek \Ya8 postdated (Tr. 29, 30). 
Q. Did you have any conversation with the de-
' fendant about the check~ 
~\.. No, there \vas nothing said particularly. Only 
ordinary eonversation. He did say he'd like 
the titles to give to his bank at the tiine. 
Q. And that's \vhy you gave .. him the titles~ 
:\.. That's right. 
Q. -vv· ell, \vas there anything said at all about 
your holding the check~ 
.A.. Nothing was said at all. 
Q. Did you notice that the check was dated the 
17th 0? 
..c\.. No. / 
The fact that n1r. Smith deposited the check on the 
15th of Septe1nber, 1951~ further bolsters the argun1ent 
that he treated the check as a present pajrnent as of the 
day of delivery, and that he had no indication of the post-
. · · dating ( Tr. 30, 31). 
On cross-examination ~Ir. Smith testified as' follows: 
(Tr·. 36) 
Q. * * * In other words, didn't he (Bruce) say 
he would have to finance the automobiles vvith 
-a finance company before the check would be 
·good~ :'" 
A. I don't think he did. All he asked was-
Q. Just a moment. You said you don't think he 
djd .. Are you sure that he didn't~ Are you 
sure1 · 
11 ~ 
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A. I'm sure he didn't. All he said was he needed 
the titles to give to his bank. Of course, you 
can assume the fact, that he needed them, the 
titles, so he could floor. You can assume it 
either way. 
THE COURr_r: Did you assume that~ 
A. No, I didn't assun1e that. 
We respectfully submit that the testimony of Mr. 
IIaslam and n{r. Smith is not inconsonant with the estab-
lishrnent of a prima facie case. Indeed, circumstances 
such as those described by these two witnesses furnish 
sufficient basis for an inference of intent to defraud; 
therefore, the case should have been submitted to the 
jury. It is .further to be noted that our statute provides 
that the drawing of a check, draft or order as contem-
plated by the statute is prima facie evidence of intent to 
defraud. See State v. Prettyman, 113 Utah 36, 191 P2d 
142. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that a review of the 
transcript and proceedings in this case. discloses ample 
and sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case; 
that a postdated check is such an instrument as was con-
templated by the legislature when it enacted the false 
check statute and inserted the words "check, ·draft, or 
order;" and that particularly is this s~ when the payee · 
12 
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is not apprised of the postdating. The ruling of the lo'\ver 
\ 
court should be reversed. 
: · .. ·-~ ... ::..... .. . . . . - . 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
.. A.ttorney General 
RICHARD J. MAUGIIAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for App-ellant 
1.3 .. 
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